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Using a partial equilibrium model, the benefits of providing improved agricultural 
market information to farmers and small-scale traders of maize, millet, sorghum and 
paddy rice in Mali are estimated.  The value of information is estimated as the reduction 
in dead-weight loss when farmers and small-scale traders with rational expectations 
respond to improved price forecasts from Market Information Systems.  The study finds 
that benefits from improved information, which can also be viewed as a reduction of the 
cost of being off the equilibrium price and quantity, are great when there is high 
uncertainty about future prices, high own-price elasticity of supply, low own-price 
elasticity of demand, and high value of crop output.  The study suggests that crop-
specific, localized Market Information Systems (MIS) designed based on local area 
supply and demand responses to prices have higher returns than national uniformly 
distributed MISs covering a wide range of commodities in the country. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Introduction 
In the 1980s and 1990s many developing countries, with donor support, invested 
in Market Information Systems (MIS) and other reforms to strengthen markets so as to 
increase incomes in rural households by inducing increased production through market 
incentives.  As part of the changes, MIS’s were established to provide support services to 
market participants such as farmers, traders and consumers (Dembélé and Staatz, 2000, 
Dembélé, et al., 2000, Dioné, 2000, Ferris, et al., 2004, Shepherd, 1997).  While many 
advantages of MIS’s have been observed, such as reduction in transaction costs, 
encouragement of arbitrage, and market transparency, which enhance competition in the 
market, not many economic tools, readily understood by policy and decision makers, 
have been developed and applied to estimate their welfare effects to households in 
developing countries. 
A number of issues have emerged among stakeholders such as donors, 
government and the private sector regarding investment in MIS.  First, there is need to 
demonstrate how provision of improved information leads to increased social welfare of 
households.  A second question is whether the social welfare is redistributed so as to 
benefit farmers, small-scale traders, and consumers.  The third issue is whether the 
benefits of providing market information to farmers and traders exceed the costs involved 
in setting up and running information services.  As a result, in the past 5 to 10 years, 
many development partners have encouraged governments, NGO and other interested 
parties to strengthen impact assessment of program and project activities to help answer 
some of the above concerns.   2
The performance MIS’s in developing countries often declines once donor 
funding is withdrawn.  This is because policy and decision makers do not readily adjust 
government budgets to fill up the financial vacuum (Aldridge, 1999, Shepherd, 1997).  
While this is partly due to lack of alternative and sustainable source of funding, the main 
problem is that benefits from MIS’s are not easily quantifiable and have some “public-
good” characteristics. 
This study aims at quantifying the benefits to society from investing in provision 
of improved market information in the form of more accurate price forecasts.  The model 
estimates the reduction in the dead-weight loss when producers with rational expectations 
respond to improved price forecasts provided by Market Information Systems.  Another 
way of looking at this is in terms of the role of access to improved information in 
reducing the costs of being out of equilibrium. 
The study will supplement efforts aimed at providing relevant analysis tools to 
governments, development partners and the private sector on how to measure the role of 
MIS’s in improving the well-being of farmers, small scale traders and consumers in 
developing countries.  The model is based on a simple economic concept, the partial 
equilibrium model, which many policy and decision makers in developing countries, who 
may not be familiar with advanced analytical methods, can readily understand.  Also, the 
data required by complex models are not readily available in developing countries, where 
MIS’s mostly collect and report commodity prices (Aldridge, 1999). 
   3
1.1 Benefits of an MIS 
This section summarizes some of the benefits that farmers and small scale traders 
can obtain from access to improved market information. 
 
1.1.1 Market Transparency and Arbitrage 
Market Information Systems can lead to greater market transparency.  Market 
transparency refers to a situation in which transacting parties have access to prices and 
other market information such as location of available supplies.  Market transparency 
helps lead to both spatial arbitrage, a process where traders transfer goods and services 
from areas of lower prices to those with higher prices, and temporal arbitrage, which 
refers to the storage of goods in order to obtain expected higher prices in the future.  
Arbitrage eventually results in increased quantity demanded of commodities in areas 
where prices are low, leading to a rise in farm gate prices.  On the other hand, spatial 
arbitrage tends to increase supplies in areas where prices exceed the cost of supply. 
Coupled with the improved ability of farmers to negotiate selling prices as they 
are better informed about price levels and trends, the net effect of providing market 
information is that aggregate prices across the country become  truer reflections of the 
overall patterns of supply and demand and the transaction and transport costs (Shepherd, 
1997).   
 
1.1.2 Reduction of Transaction Costs  
Market Information Systems can help farmers to reduce transaction costs.  
Williamson refers to transaction costs as “the economic equivalent of friction in physical   4
systems”.  He grouped transaction costs into two types: the first are ex ante transaction 
costs, which include “costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement” 
(Williamson, 1985).  These include costs of gathering, processing and coming to a 
decision within an organization and between transaction parties, sometimes including 
third parties such as government regulatory agencies.  The second type is the ex post 
transaction costs, which refer to costs of monitoring performance and enforcement of the 
agreement, including costs of dispute resolution. Williamson refers to ex post as follows: 
These include (1) the maladaption costs incurred when transactions drift out of 
alignment...(2) the haggling costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct 
ex post misalignments, (3) the setup and running costs associated with the 
governance structures (often not the courts) to which disputes are referred, and (4) 
the bonding costs of effecting secure commitments (Williamson, 1985).  
For example, Market Information Systems can help farmers reduce the time and 
money involved in finding partners with whom to trade and reduce the time they use to 
bargain to come to an agreeable price with traders.  Also, when traders work with the 
MIS, they can obtain information that can help them to identify who reliable partners are 
in a short time, which cuts down on transaction costs. 
 
1.1.3 Identification of New Markets 
Market information can help farmers identify distant and new markets.  This can 
be in terms of new products for which information becomes available or expansion of the 
geographical coverage of markets within and or outside the country, hence developing 
and facilitating extra and intra-regional trade.  This have been observed in Mali, where   5
increased access to improved market information increased market transparency and 
facilitated the entry of new cereal traders in assembly, wholesale and retail markets 
following market reforms that led to disengagement of the national grain board from 
commercial trading ((Dembélé and Staatz, 2000, Staatz, et al., 2004a); 
 
1.1.4 Design of Better Policy 
Market Information Systems can help provide information to design better 
policies.  MIS collect and compile data which can be used for statistical and planning 
purposes and monitor the impacts of policies by governments, research organizations and 
development partners.  For example, unusually high prices can be an indicator of 
shortages and lower prices an indicator of excess supply in the market.  While many 
policy makers understand this phenomenon, Market Information Systems are valuable in 
helping policy makers to understand factors that cause such shortages and excess supply, 
together with other current dynamics in the markets. 
Differences in farm gate, wholesale and retail prices can be used to make 
inferences about relationships between farmers, traders and consumers.  Market 
information is a key ingredient in running early warning and food security reserve 
management (Shepherd, 1997).  Also, information is very useful to policy makers in 
designing better policies and monitoring the impact of various government policies and 
other actions in the food system.  For example, information can be used to measure the 
impact of free food distribution on prices and demand of food in a given area. 
   6
1.1.5 Reduction in Risk and Efficient Allocation of Productive Recourses  
In the absence of programs such as marketing boards or minimum price programs, 
which buy agricultural products from farmers at fixed prices; farmers bear considerable 
risks associated with their production and marketing decisions and actions.  Consumers 
bear some of the risks transmitted to subsequent production stages in the food system, 
such as volatile prices for staple food products.  
For some agricultural crops, e.g. cassava tubers which can be stored in the ground 
for a considerable period, market information can help farmers avoid market risks such as 
harvesting and delivering products to markets at unfavorable prices.  Shepherd (1997) 
argues that farmers can use current market information to decide to postpone harvesting 
or to store produce up to that period when prices cover their production and marketing 
costs.  In addition, if farmers have an idea of prevailing or future market prices, they can 
allocate their scarce recourses to inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides and labor in a more 
productive way (Shepherd, 1997).  Thus improved market information can help farmers 
to spread out risks by diversifying and growing different crops. 
 
1.1.6 Rent Redistribution 
In many developing economies, governments may set up policies (e.g. quotas and 
licenses), that may encourage firms, individuals or organizations to behave in 
opportunistic and manipulative ways to compete for rents.  These actions, which Anne 
Krueger refers to as “rent seeking,” reduce the social welfare of consumers and producers 
because they are not backed by trade, production or value addition (Krueger, 1974).  For 
example, there are incidences in which small-scale traders near border points indulge in   7
informal channels of trading agricultural produce across borders just because they do not 
know that export and or import fees have been eliminated or substantially reduced, to the 
extent that it would be more profitable for them to use formal channels like other formal 
traders.  Access to market information facilitates the “leveling of the playing field” which 
enables informal traders to cross to formal trading, leading to rent redistribution among 
market participants  
 
1.2 Problem Statement and Research Objectives 
Using hypothetical price forecasts, observed producer prices, and production data 
from Mali, this paper utilizes a partial equilibrium model to measure the welfare benefits 
to society resulting from investing in provision of improved market information to 
producers and consumers.  Specifically, the study: 
1.  Reviews the theoretical methods used in measuring economic benefits from access to 
improved information. 
2.  Modifies and applies a price adjustment model to measure the value of returns to 
access of improved information in form of accurate price forecast in the Malian cereal 
production sector. 
 
1.3 Organization of the Paper 
This paper consists of 4 chapters.  Chapter 2 provides literature review covering 
some of the theoretical concepts and methods that have been proposed for measuring 
economic benefits of access to and utilization of improved information and their   8
shortcomings.  Chapter 3 presents the Price Adjustment Model and its application using 
data from Mali.  Chapter 4 gives a summary and conclusions of the paper.   9
CHAPTER 2:  METHODS USED TO VALUE INFORMATION 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes some of the methods that have been put forward to measure 
the value of access to improved information to producers and consumers of goods and 
services under a competitive setting. 
 
2.1 Role of Information in the Arrow-Debreu World 
Information plays an important role in the functioning of the market.  When 
Walras proposed the Walrasian price adjustment, and Marshall the Marshallian quantity 
adjustment, they assumed that if prices and quantities changed in a market, all buyers and 
sellers acquired information about the changes, which enabled them to form a new 
equilibrium almost instantaneously so that the quantity demanded would equal the 
quantity supplied.  In reality, this is not the case because individuals and firms do not 
behave this way in the market place partly because they do not instantaneously acquire 
up-to-date information to make such adjustments. 
Building on the work of Leon Walrus, Arrow and Debreu proved the existence of 
equilibrium prices in which agents traded in contingent commodities that accounted for 
different states of nature, including different locations and time in markets with 
uncertainty (Arrow and Debreu, 1954).  In the process of accounting for both temporal 
and spatial adjustments in the markets, many fundamental assumptions have to hold, and 
one of them is that agents have access to complete and symmetric information for the 
market to be properly defined.  When there is imperfect information, the neoclassical   10
partial equilibrium model attributed to Alfred Marshall and Arrow-Debreu’s general 
competitive equilibrium model may not hold, and Pareto efficiency may not be achieved.  
For example, Akerlof’s “lemon model” for the market for used cars, in which 
there is asymmetric information about the quality of cars between sellers and potential 
buyers, attests to the importance of information to the functioning of markets.  He was 
able to show that bad quality cars could drive good quality cars out of the market if 
buyers were unable to tell the true quality of the cars (Akerlof, 1970).  If buyers had 
sufficient information that the cars they were buying were of high quality, they would be 
willing to pay more.  However, if there was hidden information about the true quality of 
the cars, buyers would prefer to pay the average market value, which would drive sellers 
of good quality cars out of the market, since buyers were offering prices below the 
reservation prices of good quality cars.  This phenomenon, referred to as adverse 
selection in agency theory, results from presence of asymmetric information, and may 
lead to development of thin or missing markets. 
 
2.2 Value of Information 
Stigler (1961) suggested that the value of information is based on the benefits and 
costs of access to improved information.  The benefits of access to information are in the 
form of savings that sellers and buyers make when they have access to improved 
information.  Stigler indicated that a consumer will search for a minimum price (P) from 
available stores (n).  If  ) (p F  is the cumulative density function of p, the probability that 




0 min )] ( 1 [ dp p F P
n n .   11




− decreases as n increases, implying 
diminishing marginal benefits from search, and is given as: 
∫








min ) ( )] ( 1 [ dp p F p F P P
P n n n
n
  
The Expected Savings, E(S), from an additional unit of information is 
approximated by quantity purchased times expected reduction in price. 











− , where q=quantity bought. 
Stigler suggested that cost of information be based on search costs in terms of 
money and time spent on communication and travel incurred to obtain improved 
information.  Because there is a cost to search for information, it means that the more a 
buyer or seller indulges in search, the more costs he or she will incur, resulting in 
diminishing returns as the number of stores increases (Stigler, 1961). 
To maximize returns, one would have to ensure that the marginal cost of search 
does not exceed the marginal benefit he or she would obtain by searching the next store.  
Thus the optimal search is obtained when marginal cost of search is equated with the 
marginal returns from search. 
Stigler’s concepts have been adapted to provision of public information by Blake 
et al., (1979), who argue that the benefits of the access to improved information be 
measured in terms of the private savings made on search costs by farmers and traders by 
obtaining information from the MIS rather than  looking for the information on their own 
(Blake, et al., 1979).  An additional way of looking at benefits of an MIS would be to 
measure the increase in income that farmers and traders would obtain by making better 
decisions as a result of obtaining better information from a public information service.  In   12
a related approach, (Bonnen, 1986) in (Aldridge, 1992) suggested that value of 
information be measured as the value of the decision made with information minus the 
value of the decision made without information, minus the cost of obtaining information. 
To be able to implement the above approach, one would need to conduct periodic 
and regular surveys in order to come up with marginal benefits and marginal costs.  This 
would be expensive in terms of money and time, especially in developing countries with 
limited budgets.  For this reason, this approach is not considered for use in this paper. 
 
2.3 Information and Increase in Social Welfare 
Hayami and Peterson (1972) developed a social welfare model to estimate the 
social returns to the private sector from investing in improved forecasts.  They obtained 
the increase in social welfare as a result of increased accuracy or reducing sampling 
errors, which change the quantity produced, and compared these with the costs of 
conducting sample surveys to obtain the cost-benefit ratios.  Since this paper will use a 
modified version of Hayami and Peterson’s model, more details of this model are given 
below.  
 
2.3.1 Inventory Adjustment Model 
The first model presented in figure 1 was applied in short-run situations where 
production could not be adjusted significantly and the supply curve  ) (S  is considered to 
be perfectly inelastic.  In such a situation, inventory holders adjust release of stocks to the 
market depending on whether a public agency, e.g., United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), predicts more or less than normal crop output in the following year.    13
In the model, the difference between the predicted and actual output is referred to 
sampling error.  For example, if USDA predicted a far-below-average crop  ) ' (Q  in the 
following year, the inventory holders would expect higher prices and reduce the rate at 
which they deplete their inventories.  This induces a shift of the supply curve to the left 
) ' (Q  leading to high consumer prices  ) ' (P  and reduction in quantity demanded to ' OQ .  
This leads to a reduction in total social welfare (producer and consumer surplus) 
by Q ABQ' .  The gain in producer surplus to inventory holders will depend on the 
elasticity of demand (Hayami and Peterson, 1972).  If demand is inelastic, the producer 
surplus will be higher since an increase in prices will not lead to a more than proportional 
reduction in quantity consumed.  When demand is elastic, the producer surplus will be 
less because an increase in price will result in a more than proportional reduction in 
quantity consumed.   14
Figure 1:  Inventory Adjustment Model 
 
In the next period, Hayami and Peterson argue that there would be a carry-over 
Q Q'  which in addition to the normal production OQ would total to ' ' OQ .  At this point 
there would be a reduction in consumer prices to ' ' P  (below P which would prevail if 
there was no reporting error).  This leads to an increase in social welfare by  Q ' ACQ' . 
The net loss to society from inaccurate statistical reporting (i.e., initially 
underestimating the size of the harvest, leading to a reduction in the drawdown on 
inventories in period 1) would equal the losses when prices rise minus gains when prices 
fall, which is given by   AGEF Q ' ACQ'   - Q ABQ' = .  The value of improved information 
(i.e., more accurate forecasts) is considered to be the reduction in the welfare loss to 
consumers and producers as a result of reducing the error in forecasting by the 
forecasting agency, which Hayami and Peterson estimated as:  
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Where: 
Q = the quantity of the commodity produced 
P = the producer price of the commodity 








= = absolute own-price elasticity of demand. 
The assumptions in the model are that (1) the demand is linear, and that (2) price 
elasticity of demand is known.  Equation (2.1) suggests that the payoffs to market 
information (in the form of better production forecasts) are greater where: (a) the 
sampling error, which shows previous uncertainty regarding quantity produced, is large;  
(b) the value of inventories, as reflected in the price, is high; and (c) the own-price 
elasticity of demand is low. 
 
2.3.2 Production Adjustment Model 
In the Production Adjustment Model, it is assumed that producers can adjust 
output in response to additional information from the reporting agency, i.e., there is an 
upward-slopping supply curve  ) (S , as shown in figure 2. The assumptions are: (1) that 
price expectations change because of new information from the statistical reporting 
agency, (2) producers adjust production along the supply curve, and (3) the supply and 
demand curves are linear and their elasticities are known.  Because this is a production 
adjustment model, based on rational expectations, it works like a cobweb model, and   16
requires that the elasticity of supply be less than the elasticity of demand to ensure 
stability and convergence to equilibrium. 
Hayami and Peterson’s model starts by assuming the producers are unaware that 
their true production level would be at OQ (which is not the traditional equilibrium 
location on the graph, possibly because of various market failures such as externalities, 
public-goods and incomplete and asymmetric information) if their production plans 
materialized.  If a production survey could correctly predict that production would 
beOQ, and the demand is known, then the predicted price in the next period would 
beOP .  This would induce producers to cut production so as to put output  a OQ  on the 
market.   
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From Hayami and Peterson, 1972   17
At quantity a OQ , the consumer price would be  a OP  implying that the marginal 
benefit of an extra unit  ) ( a P  is more than the marginal cost ) (P , and that society would 
benefit if more were to be produced.  Under competition, and in the absence of 
externalities, at output a Q , there is misallocation leading to a dead-weight loss to society 
given by area ZHT. 
Hayami and Peterson assumed that sampling errors occur randomly with a 
probability 0.5 that they are more or less than the true parameter.  For example, if the 
quantity predicted is ' OQ , then the total loss to society would be ZIE, a reduction in social 
loss of IHTE.  On the other hand, if the sampling error resulted in an overestimate of 
production to ' ' OQ , then the dead-weight loss would be ZJF, an increase in social loss of 
HJFT.  The difference between these two areas (HJFT- IHTE) equals the two shaded 
areas. 
The expected value of net social loss to society is given as half the sum of the 
shaded areas, which takes care of the fact that the sampling error might be larger or 
smaller than the true estimate.  The estimated social loss due to random sampling errors 
is: 
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Where: 
Q = the quantity of the commodity produced 
P  = the price of the commodity 















=  = the own-price elasticity of supply. 
Again, in this model, the value of information is considered to be the reduction in 
the welfare loss to consumers and producers as a result of reducing the error in 
forecasting by the forecasting agency.  The data requirements for estimating benefits to 
improved information using Hayami and Peterson’s models are the crop forecasting error, 
value of crop production and demand and supply elasticities. 
Just like in equation (2.1), the model assumes linear demand and supply, and 
known own-price elasticity of demand and supply.  Equation (2.2) suggests that the 
payoffs to market information are greater where (a) the sampling error is large (b) the 
value of farm production is large (c) the own-price elasticity of demand is small and (d) 
the own-price elasticity of supply is high. 
This paper modifies this approach by assuming that the public information service 
supplies improved information in terms of a better price forecast to producers and small 
scale traders.  The benefits of improved information from the reduction of welfare loss 
due to a better price forecast from Market Information Systems.  This is appealing 
because the concept is simple to understand by policy and decision makers who may not 
be familiar with more complex models.  Secondly, the data requirements are few and 
reasonable, unlike Stigler’s method in 2.2, and the decision-theoretic approach discussed 
below. 
   19
2.4 Decision-Theoretic Approach 
This approach presented by Eisgruber (1978) measures the benefit of providing 
improved information as the difference in expected utility given a prevailing state of 
nature and the cost of obtaining the information.  The prevailing states of nature are 
assumed to be known with varying probabilities.  This method demonstrates that those 
consumers who alter their decisions on how to allocate their resources as a result of 
access to improved information obtain better payoffs than those who do not have such 
information.  To demonstrate this approach, assume there are two states of the world 
(these can be generalized to many, say n, but for simplicity, only two are considered).  
Then the decision theoretic-approach is such that:  
) ( ) (   ) (   E(U) I C W U W U b b g g − + = π π       ( 2 . 3 )  
Where 
E(U) =expected utility from a decision or action 
g π =probability of “good times” when consumers have information about prices 
b π =probability of “bad times” when consumers have no information about prices 
W =wealth of an individual 
) (W U = von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index which is concave 
C(I)=cost of obtaining information 
Equation (2.3) suggests that expected utility from improved information depends 
on subjective probabilities, the nature of the utility function assumed, the wealth of 
consumers of information and the cost of attaining the information.  The presence of 
market information enables the consumer to alter the probabilities of good and bad times.    20
In the good times, when  g π is approaching or equal to one, consumers have information 
on the source of lower priced goods, and attain higher payoffs.  In the bad times,  b π  is 
tending to one, implying a state of total uncertainty, and consumers pay more for a good 
that they would otherwise have obtained at a cheaper price.  If the cost of attaining 
information is low, then the expected utility from access to improved information is 
higher.  Assuming that information can be measured in some form of units, say m ,  e.g. 
number of messages from a radio programs, number of telephone calls, or short message 
service (SMS) requests, each with a unit cost of  m P  to the farmer, the cost may take the 
form  m P I C m = ) ( .  Another assumption is that consumers of information, in this case 
farmers and small scale traders, are risk averse with a concave utility function. 
In this approach, the states of nature are represented by subjective probabilities, 
g π  and b π , which can range anywhere between zero and one.  Obtaining probabilities, 
the utility functions and the form of the cost function is a difficult task.  Thus this 
approach of estimating value of information is limited to small problems with a few 
discrete probability choices (Eisgruber, 1978, Nicholson, 2002).  For these reasons, this 
approach is not considered of reasonable applicability to the problem at hand. 
 
2.5 Complementarities with other Reforms 
In some African countries, such as Mali and Uganda, provision of market 
information was part of the reforms in the agricultural markets that were implemented by 
governments as part of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) supported by the 
World Bank and IMF.  For example, in Mali, MIS activities were part of the market   21
reforms that included redefinition of the role of the state cereal marketing board to focus 
on maintaining a national security stock and facilitating the role of the private trade, 
which led to increased private sector participation in trade within Mali and between 
neighboring countries (Dembélé, et al., 2003, Dembélé and Staatz., 1999).  Such 
programs also led to increases in production and farm household incomes.  Such 
complementarities can potentially lead to attribution problems.  One way of dealing with 
this would be to jointly measure the benefits and costs of complementary programs.      22
CHAPTER 3: APPLICATION OF THE PRICE ADJUSTMENT MODEL 
 
3.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, Hayami and Peterson’s Production Adjustment model for 
measuring the returns to access to improved information is modified, to come up with a 
Price Adjustment Model.  It is assumed that public information services provide 
improved information in the form of better price forecasts to producers and small scale 
traders, disseminated through urban and rural radios, television and other channels.  
Using production and producer price data on four major cereals (millet, maize, sorghum 
and rice) released by the Agricultural Market Watch (OMA
1) in Mali, and hypothetical 
price forecasts, the benefits of access to improved information are modeled as the 
reduction of social welfare loss due to better price forecast from Market Information 
Systems.  An alternative way of looking at this is to measure the benefit of access to 
improved information as the reduction in the cost of being out off equilibrium price and 
quantity.  Millet, maize, sorghum and rice are selected because they account for more 
than 85% of the cereal calories in Mali (Dembélé and Staatz., 1999). 
The price adjustment model is based on a partial equilibrium model, assuming a 
closed economy with no international trade.  In reality, some agricultural crops are 
exported from Mali, but no adjustments are made for purposes of keeping this model 
simple. In reality, for landlocked countries like Mali and Uganda, facing high transport 
costs, most bulky commodities like cereals are only semi-tradables, so the general 
conclusions from a closed-economy model like this one should be similar in the general 
direction, if not the magnitude, for these countries. Another assumption is that producers 
                                                 
1 OMA -Observatoire du Marché Agricole- by its French acronym    23
adjust their production outputs based on new information, such as price forecasts from 
the public information agencies, in this case OMA. 
In the model, it is assumed that producers have or form rational expectations 
about quantity demanded if they know future prices.  It is assumed that producers make 
decisions in such a way that they produce more when they expect future prices to be 
higher than the current price and less when they expect future prices to be lower than the 
current prices.  The model is developed assuming a single homogenous commodity, but 
at the estimation stage, it is replicated to cover four separate commodities which are sold 
on the market. 
Another important assumption is that users of market information are able to use 
reported forecasts to make not only production strategies such as how much to grow, but 
also post-harvest marketing strategies such as when to sell or store.  For example in Mali, 
apart from expectations based of future prices, marketed surplus also depends on 
expected production, which is also influenced by climatic conditions such as expected 
rain in the next season (Aldridge, 1999).  
The benefits of access to improved information are in form of reduction in net 
social welfare loss by producers and consumers as a result of reduction in price 
forecasting errors.  This could be also viewed as the reduction in the cost of being out of 
equilibrium.  In the model, it is assumed that the farmers are the producers, and the 
merchants, or small-scale traders, are the consumers.  In reality, both farmers and small-
scale traders will take on the role of producer and consumers interchangeably.   
This model is appealing for evaluating benefits of MIS’s in Africa since they have 
not developed the capacity to forecast quantities but find it easier to collect and   24
disseminate price information.  The assumptions made can significantly influence the 
nature of the results.  The parameters used in the analysis are conservative as much as 
possible so that the estimates reflect the “lower bound” of social welfare loss due to price 
forecasting errors. 
 
3.1 The Price Adjustment Model 
The graphical form of the price adjustment model is given in figure 3 below.  The 
model uses linear demand and supply curves, and assumes that farmers adjust their 
production along an upward sloping supply curve ) (S .  Price 
e P  and quantity 
e Q  
would be the theoretical competitive equilibrium if there were no market imperfections 
such as lack of complete and symmetric information, presence of externalities and or 
public goods.  At this point, there would be no dead-weight loss and thus no welfare loss 
(i.e., the cost of being off the equilibrium price and quantity is zero).  However, as 
expected, due to market imperfections, assume that the true price in the next period 
(maybe a year or production season of a crop) would be OP, and at that price, the true 
expected quantity supplied would be OQ, and the loss in social welfare would be 
represented by the dead-weight loss (ZHT). The role of forecasting is to try to reduce this 
loss of social welfare.  The analysis in the model is based on a price forecasts that are 
below the competitive equilibrium price. 
Suppose a public information agency forecasts a higher price OP'  in the next 
period above the true market price P that would prevail.  Then the production strategy of 
the producers would be to produce more in order to benefit from the higher producer 
priceOP' .  Assuming that producers adopt the forecast, based on the expectations of the   25
priceOP' , producers increase output to quantity OQ' on the market.  At quantity OQ' 
and based on the demand schedule, consumers pay 
'
a OP  leading to a loss in welfare to 
society equal to (ZIE).  This means that this higher forecast of OP'  instead of the 
expected price OP saves society welfare losses equal to HIET. 
 
Figure 3:  Price Adjustment Model 
 
If, however, the public information agency forecasts a lower price  ' OP'  in the 
next period, producers would expect a lower price and adjust their production to ' OQ' .  
This leads to a higher consumer price, 
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Adopted from Hayami and Peterson, 1972 
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welfare to ZJF. This means that a lower price forecast increases society’s welfare losses 
by JHTF. 
Adopting Hayami and Peterson’s assumption that sampling errors are higher or 
lower with a probability of 0.5, the expected value of net social loss to society, E (SL) 
due to forecasting error would be half the difference between areas HIET and JHTF, 
given as the two shaded areas. 
E (SL) =0.5(area MLKT+ area HNRW). 
These areas on the partial equilibrium model can be computed using the sets of 





) ˆ ( −
= = forecast error which is a percentage of the true price P  
P  = producer price of the commodity. 
P ˆ = forecast producer price of the commodity  















=  = the own-price elasticity of supply. 
Then: 
Area MLKT=LK*KT: 
Change in price resulting from the forecast or sampling error: 
P e P p = ∆ = =   MT LK       ( 3 . 1 )  
Expected change in quantity supplied when price changes from P to ' ' P  is:   27
s p s QE e
P
Q
E P Q KT = ∆ = ∆ = = * * LM      (3.2)   
Therefore MLKT= s pPQE e
2         ( 3 . 3 )  
Area HNRW=NR*RW: 
Expected change in consumer prices: 
NR=HW is the expected change in consumer prices from  a P  to 
'
a P  when there is a 
change in quantity demanded from Qto















P NR = =
∆
= ∆ = * *      ( 3 . 4 )  
Expected change in quantity demanded: 
RW=NH is the expected change in quantity demanded from Qto
' ' Q .when the 
expected price changes from  a P  to
' '
a P .  It is the same as KT=LM, which is the expected 
change in quantity supplied when price changes from P to ' ' P  and from equation (3.2), 







       ( 3 . 6 )  
Using equation (3.3) and (3.6), the expected value of net social loss, E (SL) resulting 
from sampling errors committed while forecasting the “true” future price P is given as: 
















1        ( 3 . 7 )  
To calculate the expected net social loss, or the cost of being off the equilibrium 
price and quantity, requires the price forecasting error, the value of crop production, and 
demand and supply elasticities.  The expected value of information to producers and   28
consumers in a single period is approximated by the reduction in the net social loss 
resulting from reducing price forecast errors (i.e. the reduction in the cost of being off the 
equilibrium price and quantity).  The comparative statics in this model are similar to 
those of Hayami and Peterson (1972) discussed in section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.   Equation 
(3.7) suggests that the payoffs to providing improved agricultural market information to 
both producing and consuming households are greater where: 
(a) There is higher previous uncertainty regarding the true future price, i.e. where 
the price forecast error, ( p e ), is large.  Indeed, the cost of being off the equilibrium price 
and quantity goes up exponentially with the price forecast error. The intuition here is that 
when farmers receive very low price forecasts for the next period, they will respond by 
producing very low output, which will lead to a large dead-weight loss resulting from an 
excess shortage in the closed economy.  When the price forecast is far above the actual 
price level, but less than the equilibrium price, farmers produce more, leading to a 
smaller dead-weight loss to society.  In terms of social welfare redistribution, and holding 
other factors constant, an underestimate of the true future price hurts consumers through 
higher food prices, and an overestimation of the true future price benefits consumers 
through lower food prices. Overall, as the price forecast error becomes smaller, society 
benefits through the reduction in the dead-weight loss (reduction in the cost of being off 
the equilibrium price and quantity) resulting from better price forecast from the market 
information service. 
(b) The own-price elasticity of demand, ( d E ), is inelastic.  If supply increases 
because of a higher price forecast, the welfare loss is larger when demand is inelastic than 
when elastic.  Also, if supply decreases because of a lower price forecast, the welfare loss   29
is larger when demand is inelastic, than when it is elastic.  The intuition is that when the 
production decisions of the producers respond to price forecasts, but the consumption 
decisions (quantity demanded) do not, then there is a misallocation of resources  because 
consumers want a relatively fixed amount of production but production is varying due to 
“mistaken” price forecasts.  Thus, there is a  higher expected social welfare loss, or the 
cost of being off the equilibrium price and quantity is higher the more inelastic is 
demand.  
(c) The own-price elasticity of supply, ( s E ) is high.  The intuition behind this is 
that a poor price forecast would induce a relatively large shift in production, implying a 
relatively large misallocation of resources.  For example, if the MIS predicted a large 
reduction in next season price (i.e., a large forecast error), farmers would respond by 
more than proportionately reducing the quantity produced in the next season.  In the 
absence of imports, the reduction in quantity produced would lead to a higher loss in 
social welfare to both producers and consumers. 
(d) The value of farm production  ) (PQ  is large.  The larger the value of 
production involved, the larger the potential misallocation of resources that can result 
from a poor forecast.  The value of production is the product of two factors: the physical 
volume (Q) of the product entering the market, and the per-unit value (P).  This means 
that even if the per-unit value of a product is low (e.g., for some cereals), if there is a 
large volume entering the market, then the cost to society of being off the equilibrium 
price and quantity due a poor forecast price with respect to this crop can be high.  
Similarly, even if a crop has a high unit value, if little is produced, then poor market 
information (or a poor forecast) may not lead to a higher cost of being off the equilibrium   30
price and quantity, unless the lack of information is a major reason why farmers don’t 
produce the crop in high volumes. 
 
3.2 Price Forecast Errors 
A forecast error ( t e ), at period (t) is defined as the difference between the true 
price (P ) and the predicted or forecast price (P ˆ ).  i.e.,  t t t P P e − = ˆ .  The forecast error is 






) ˆ ( −
=  and P e P p = ∆ .   
Forecast error can be estimated using many methods, a topic which is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  However, availability of data, skills of analysis, costs involved, 
simplicity of understanding by decision makers, and the level of accuracy needed 
determine which forecasting method is adopted (Aldridge, 1999).  For example, because 
of limited data, Aldridge (1999) used time series instead of structural methods to forecast 
cereal prices in Mali.  The study found that Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average 
(ARIMA) and Vector Error Correction (VEC) models evaluated by statistical tests such 
as the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) and the Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
(MAPE) performed well in estimating cereal prices in Mali.  The forecast errors used in 
this study are differences between observed prices released by the MIS and hypothetical 
price forecasts.  To facilitate sensitivity analysis, the hypothetical forecast errors range 
from 40% (an extremely poor forecast) to 0% (extremely accurate) forecast error. 
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3.3 Value of Farm Production 
Value of agricultural production is obtained as the product of quantity produced 
and producer prices obtained from FAOSTAT data 2006 (http://faostat.fao.org/).  The 
study uses data spanning a period of ten years from 1992, before the 1994 devaluation of 
the CFA franc, to 2002.  Figures 4 show the quantities produced in metric tons and the 
nominal producer prices of the four cereals in CFA francs. 
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 3.4 Demand and Supply Elasticities 
The elasticities of demand and supply used in this paper are obtained from 
numerous studies that have been conducted in Mali and other West African countries.  A 
careful review of the elasticities was done before selecting the ones used in this paper.  
Using the double log model with data from urban Mali between 1985/86, Rogers and 
Lowdermilk (1991) estimated the own-price elasticity of sorghum and millet to be -0.53 
and the own price elasticity of rice was -0.68 (Rogers and Lowdermilk, 1991)  In another 
study by Coulibaly, the own-price elasticity of demand for millet and sorghum were 
estimated to be -0.24 before 1994 and -0.63 after the devaluation of the CFA franc 
((Coulibaly, 1999) in (Vitale and Sanders, 2005)).  Using an Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS) on panel data from 2000-2001, Camara (2004) estimated Marshallian 
(uncompensated) own-price elasticities of demand for sorghum and millet of -0.691, rice 
of -0.767 and maize of -1.968.  This study uses the estimates from the Rogers and 
Lowdermilk study for 1992 and the Camara study estimates for 2002. Sensitivity analysis 
is done for 2002 only, using elasticities estimated by Camara because: (1) they are 
complete in a sense that they cover all the crops of interest in this study, and (2) they are 
computed using the AIDS model, which is superior to its predecessors in demand 
analysis (Camara, 2004).  The Marshallian (uncompensated), and not the Hicksian 
(compensated) own-price elasticities of demand are used because the model uses 
consumer surplus to approximate the changes in welfare of farmers and small-scale 
traders in this study.  This is justifiable because the Hicksian demand function is based on 
utility, which is not directly observable while the Marshallian uses the ordinary market 
demand function based on prices and income (Mas-Colell, et al., 1995, Varian, 1992).    33
On the supply side, crop yield elasticities with respect to own-crop prices for the 
sub-Saharan region estimated by IFPRI are used as the proxy for the elasticity of supply 
for the cereals crops. These are 0.18 for rice, 0.17 for maize and 0.14 for millet and 
sorghum (Rosegrant, et al., 2001).  These elasticities of supply are close to those from a 
previous study in (Sadoulet and Janvry, 1992).  Using an integrated CGE-Multi-market 
approach, the elasticity of output supply for food crops was estimated to be 0.20 
(Sadoulet and Janvry, 1992).  There is a potential problem of how one would estimate the 
elasticities of supply when farmers are uncertain about the future price.  The 
methodological answer to this question would be beyond the scope of this paper.  
However, to take care of the potential variations in the elasticities of demand and supply 
used, a sensitivity analysis within a 100% range is done for the elasticities used. 
 
3.5 Results 
The results from this method of estimating the benefits from access to improved 
information are summarized in table 1 below. Two periods are covered, 1992 (before the 
1994 devaluation of the CFA franc) and in 2002 (after the devaluation).  Part 1 of table 1 
contains elasticities of demand and supply, and hypothetical forecast errors in the range 
of zero to forty percent of the true observed prices.  
Part 2 of table 1 contains production and producer price data for 1992 and 2002 
respectively.  The value of farm production is obtained by multiplying quantity produced 
by producer prices for the four crops.  This value is converted into US dollar equivalent 
using the average exchange rate between the CFA franc and the USD for the 
corresponding year.  For example in 1992, the value of farm production is estimated to be   34
$27 million for maize, $97 million for millet, $100 million for paddy rice and $100 
million for sorghum.  In 2002, the value of farm production is estimated to be $38 million 
for maize, $105 million for millet, $130 million for paddy rice and $80 million for 
sorghum.  From part 1 and part 2 of table 1, the value of improved information to society 
in the model depends on the elasticity of demand, elasticity of supply, and the price 
forecasting errors, and the value of crop output.    35
Table 1:  Estimates of Social Returns from Access to Improved Market Information 
Part 1:   Elasticities of demand and supply and hypothetical percentage forecast errors 
Elasticities Maize Millet Rice, Paddy Sorghum Total Maize Millet Rice, Paddy Sorghum Total
Elasticity of demand -0.53 -0.53 -0.68 -0.53 -1.968 -0.691 -0.767 -0.691
Elasticity of supply 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.14
Hypothetical Price Forecast Errors
High (40%) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
35% 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
30% 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
25% 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
20% 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
15% 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
10% 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
5% 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Part 2:  Production, prices and value of farm production in '000 CFA francs and USD, 1992 and 2002
Crop Production and Prices Maize Millet Rice, Paddy Sorghum Maize Millet Rice, Paddy Sorghum
Production (MT) 192,530 582,296 410,018 602,254 363,629 795,146 710,446 641,695
Price CFA Franc/MT 38,000 45,000 66,000 45,000 72,200 92,100 127,600 87,000
Value of Farm Production (CFAF)* 7,316,140 26,203,320 27,061,188 27,101,430 26,254,014 73,232,947 90,652,910 55,827,465
Value of Farm Production (USD)**  27,196,535    97,406,490    100,595,472    100,745,065    37,667,705    105,070,297    130,063,429    80,097,943   
Part 3: Social loss corresponding to percentage of forecasting error for 1992 and 2002
Price Forecast Error Maize Millet Rice, Paddy Sorghum Total Maize Millet Rice, Paddy Sorghum Total
High (40%) 488,511 1,379,129 1,832,021 1,426,398 5,126,059 556,533 1,415,210 2,312,450 1,078,853 5,363,046
35% 374,017 1,055,896 1,402,641 1,092,086 3,924,639 426,095 1,083,520 1,770,469 825,997 4,106,082
30% 274,788 775,760 1,030,512 802,349 2,883,408 313,050 796,056 1,300,753 606,855 3,016,713
25% 190,825 538,722 715,633 557,187 2,002,367 217,396 552,816 903,301 421,427 2,094,940
20% 122,128 344,782 458,005 356,600 1,281,515 139,133 353,803 578,112 269,713 1,340,761
15% 68,697 193,940 257,628 200,587 720,852 78,262 199,014 325,188 151,714 754,178
10% 30,532 86,196 114,501 89,150 320,379 34,783 88,451 144,528 67,428 335,190
5% 7,633 21,549 28,625 22,287 80,095 8,696 22,113 36,132 16,857 83,798
0% 00 0 0 00 0 00 0
Part 4: Marginal social returns from reduction of price forecasting error in dollars from
Price Forecast Error of Maize Millet Rice, Paddy Sorghum Total Maize Millet Rice, Paddy Sorghum Total
40% to 35% 114,495 323,233 429,380 334,312 1,201,420 130,437 331,690 541,980 252,856 1,256,964
35% to 30% 99,229 280,136 372,129 289,737 1,041,231 113,046 287,465 469,716 219,142 1,089,369
30% to 25% 83,963 237,038 314,879 245,162 881,041 95,654 243,239 397,452 185,428 921,774
25% to 20% 68,697 193,940 257,628 200,587 720,852 78,262 199,014 325,188 151,714 754,178
20% to 15% 53,431 150,842 200,377 156,012 560,663 60,871 154,789 252,924 118,000 586,583
15% to 10% 38,165 107,744 143,127 111,437 400,473 43,479 110,563 180,660 84,285 418,988
10% to 5% 22,899 64,647 85,876 66,862 240,284 26,087 66,338 108,396 50,571 251,393
5% to 0% 7,633 21,549 28,625 22,287 80,095 8,696 22,113 36,132 16,857 83,798
*  Value of Farm Production in '000 CFAF
** 1992 Exchange rate 1 USD=269.01 CFAF, 2002 Exchange rate 1 USD=696.99 CFA, source: CIA World Fact Book
1992 2002  36
3.6 Loss of Social Welfare 
The loss of welfare to society resulting from price forecast errors is computed in 
part 3 of table 1 for the periods 1992 and 2002.  Nine discrete levels of forecast errors are 
developed to show how loss in social welfare, or the cost of being off the equilibrium 
price and quantity, reduces with reduction in the price forecast error. Starting with an 
error rate of 40%, the error is decreased in a discrete descending order in intervals of 5%, 
up to 0% error, which would depict a perfect forecast.  For example, in part 3 for the year 
1992 for sorghum, when the price forecast error is 40%, society losses $ 1.4 million, and 
if this forecasting error is reduced to 35%, society looses $1.1 million.  If there is a 
perfect price forecast, meaning a 0% forecast error, then the loss in social welfare from 
future price uncertainty, holding other factors constant, is zero. 
 
3.7 Benefits of MIS through Improved Information 
Part 4 of table 1 shows the marginal social returns from reducing the price 
forecasting error.  It shows how much society would save if the price forecasting error 
were reduced to different ranges between 40% and 0%.  The model computes the 
reduction in the dead-weight loss when farmers with rational expectations respond to 
improved price forecasts provided by market information systems.  For example in part 4 
of table 1, reducing the price forecast error for paddy rice in 2002 from 40% to 35% 
would save $0.54 million of social welfare, while reducing the forecast error from 10% to 
5% would save $0.1 million dollars worth in social welfare.  For all the four cereal crops, 
reducing the price forecast error in 2002 from 40% to 35% would save $1.3 million in   37
social welfare, while reducing the forecast error from 10% to 5% would save $0.25 
million dollars worth in social welfare.  
As a caveat, it should be noted that these figures are obtained from a partial 
equilibrium model and therefore face an aggregation problem due to summing up the 
expected gains from better MIS forecasts without taking care of the nature of 
complementary and supplementary relationships between the four commodities in the 
model.  Summing up across all changes in social welfare from MIS-forecasts of each 
crop individually will likely not give the same result than if all crops faced the same poor 
forecast at the same time because:  (a) the elasticity of supply of all cereals in the 
aggregate is likely to be less elastic than any one cereal individually (as there is less room 
for inter-crop substitution in production if all cereals are affected at once).  This would 
mean that the current summing up of all four separate crops would tend to overestimate 
the cost of poor forecasts of all grains in aggregate. (b) On the other hand, the price 
elasticity of demand for all grains in aggregate is likely to be lower than for the grains 
taken individually, as there is less scope for substitution between grains and other foods 
as there is among grains.  So this would tend to under-estimate the effect of a poor price 
forecast for all grains in the aggregate.  Whether the aggregation error leads to an under-
estimate or an over-estimate of the total cost of poor price forecasts for all grain crops at 
once depends on the relative balance of these two effects and can’t be answered a-priori. 
 
3.8 Sensitivity Analysis of the Benefits to Elasticity of Demand and Supply 
This section analyzes the sensitive of the model is to changes in key parameters 
used.  These are the price forecasting errors, the elasticity of demand and elasticity of   38
supply for the four cereal crops.  This is done for 2002, but can be applied to any year 
without loss of generality.  Many scenarios can be made, but only four are considered in 
this section.  
 
3.8.1 Effect of Changes in Price Forecast Errors. 
Figure 5A shows that the losses in social welfare increase with price forecast 
errors, keeping elasticities of demand and supply constant.  In other words, the cost of 
being off the equilibrium price and quantity increases as the forecast error increases.  The 
smooth increase in the losses is partly because of the linear nature of the demand and 
supply functions used in the model.  The results are a graphical representation in part 3 of 
table 1 for 2002.  For example, the total loss in welfare to society when a 40% forecast 
error is committed is $5.4 million while a 10% forecast error results in a $.34 million loss 
per annum. 
Figure 5B, shows the marginal social returns related to a five percent decrease in 
price forecast errors.  For example, when the price forecast error is reduced from 40% to 
35% and from 10% to 5%, society benefits by saving $1.2 and $0.25 million respectively.  
The figure shows that as the forecasting errors reduce, the marginal benefits also reduce.   39
 
Figure 5:  Social Welfare Loss and Marginal Social Returns Associated with 
Reduction in Forecast Errors for Maize, Millet, Paddy Rice and Sorghum in Mali, 
2002 
 
Fig 5A. Social welfare loss corresponding to 
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Fig 5B. Marginal social returns from reduction of 
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Keeping the three other parameters constant (demand and supply elasticities and 
value of production), any price forecast different from the prevailing market price will 
lead to a loss in social welfare.  The magnitude of the loss of social welfare increases 
with the size of the forecasting errors.  This means farmers, small-scale traders, and 
consumers lose more when they produce and consume a crop when there is high 
uncertainty regarding future prices.  Here, uncertainty is manifested in the forecast error 
which increases the loss in social welfare. 
The above estimates are computed using a partial equilibrium model and the 
estimated benefits are for each individual crop.  Aggregating the benefits makes the sum 
significant in comparison with the setup and running costs of MIS in developing 
countries.  For instance, one of the assumptions in this model is that MIS’s forecast and 
disseminated information to farmers using mostly radio, mobile telephones, television,   40
bill boards, and word of mouth.  Estimated costs of disseminating information by radio 
have been reported to be US$120,000 per annum in Kenya, US$20,000 per annum per 
language in Uganda and US$10,000 per annum in Tanzania (Shepherd, 2001a, Shepherd, 
2001b). 
In Uganda, the overall costs of setting up and running a localized micro 
information service serving a population of about one million households growing maize 
and beans was estimated to be US$30,000 per annum.  Using anecdotal information and 
assuming that MIS contributed an additional 10% (27 Uganda shillings /= or $0.015 
USD) increase of farm gate price per kilogram of maize produced by 1 million small 
scale households, each with an estimated production of 200 kilograms per year, the gains 
from a localized Market Information Systems were estimated to be 100 times more than 
investment required to setting up and run the service (Muganga, et al., 2000).  This study, 
done with more improved economic tools, and using empirical parameters, indicates that 
the social benefits of providing improved information to farmers and small scale traders 
far outweigh the required investment costs.   
Currently, the cost of running the market information service in Mali is estimated 
at $0.35 million per year (Staatz, 2006). Given that this figure covers many crops and the 
whole country, and that the estimates in part 3 and 4 of table 1 cover only four 
commodities, it is reasonable to state that the benefit of providing market information 
which results into reducing price forecast errors within a 10% to 15% range are more 
than the costs of running the service.  This argument can be made stronger given that this 
model does not capture all the benefits of providing improved Market Information 
Systems to farmers and small-scale traders.   41
As a caveat, it should be noted that these figures are obtained from a partial 
equilibrium model and therefore face an aggregation problem due to summing up the 
estimated benefits for all the four commodities.  In addition, in a general equilibrium 
setting, one would expect the gains to either increase or decrease depending on the 
magnitude of the complementary and supplementary relationships of the four 
commodities in the model.  Figure 5A shows that the loss of social welfare increase 
exponentially when there is high uncertainty about future prices and high elasticities of 
supply, as will be discussed below. 
 
3.8.2 Effect of Changes in Elasticity of Demand 
In the model, it is observed that as elasticity of demand increases, holding other 
factors constant, the expected loss in social welfare reduces. To solve the potential 
problem of overestimating the social loss, sensitivity analysis is done by increasing the 
elasticity of demand up to 100%, holding elasticity of supply constant.  Figure 6A and 
table 2, part 1 show that the total social loss in welfare from access to more accurate 
information does not respond very much to changes in elasticities of demand, compared 
to changes is supply elasticities as will be seen in the next section.  Sensitivity analysis on 
the elasticity of demand was not done for smaller elasticities than those found in the 
literature review because it would overestimate expected social loss which in turn would 
overestimate the expected marginal benefits from access to improved forecasts.   42
Figure 6:  Effect of an Increase in Elasticity of Demand to Loss in Social 
Welfare and Marginal Returns from Access to Improved Price Forecasts for Maize, 
Millet, Paddy Rice and Sorghum in Mali, 2002 
Fig 6A. Effect of an increase in elasticity of demand 
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Fig 6B. Effect of an increase in elasticity of demand 
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For example, in 2002, if a 40% forecast error is committed, at the elasticities of 
demand and supply in table 1, part 1, (i.e. the default elasticities); the total loss in welfare 
from the four commodities is $5.4 million.  When the elasticity of demand is increased by 
50%, holding the price forecast error at 40%, the total loss in welfare from the four 
commodities reduces to $5.1 million, representing only a 6% reduction in welfare loss.     43
Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis of Effect of an Increase in Elasticity of Demand to Loss 
in Social Welfare and Marginal Social Returns to Access to Improved Price 
Forecasts for Maize, Millet, Paddy Rice and Sorghum in Mali, 2002 
Part 1:  Senstivity of Loss in Social Welfare to Increase in Elasticity of Demand 
Price Forecast Error 0% increase 25% 50% 75% 100%
40% 5,363,046               5,182,252           5,061,723           4,975,631           4,911,062          
35% 4,106,082               3,967,662           3,875,382           3,809,468           3,760,032          
30% 3,016,713               2,915,017           2,847,219           2,798,793           2,762,472          
25% 2,094,940               2,024,317           1,977,236           1,943,606           1,918,384          
20% 1,340,761               1,295,563           1,265,431           1,243,908           1,227,766          
15% 754,178                  728,754              711,805              699,698              690,618             
10% 335,190                  323,891              316,358              310,977              306,941             
5% 83,798                    80,973                79,089                77,744                76,735               
0% -                          -                      -                      -                      -                     
Part 2: Sensitivty of Marginal Social Returns to Increase in Elasticity of Demand
Price Forecast Error fr0% increase 25% 50% 75% 100%
5% to 0% 83,798                    80,973                79,089                77,744                76,735               
10% to 5% 251,393                  242,918              237,268              233,233              230,206             
15% to 10% 418,988                  404,863              395,447              388,721              383,677             
20% to 15% 586,583                  566,809              553,626              544,210              537,147             
25% to 20% 754,178                  728,754              711,805              699,698              690,618             
30% to 25% 921,774                  890,700              869,984              855,187              844,089             
35% to 30% 1,089,369               1,052,645           1,028,163           1,010,675           997,560             
40% to 35% 1,256,964               1,214,590           1,186,341           1,166,164           1,151,030          
Percentage Increase in Elastisity of Demand
Percentage Increase in Elastisity of Demand
 
This suggests that the model is not very sensitive to changes in elasticity of 
demand as compared to elasticity of supply (shown in the next section).  That is why the 
social welfare loss curves show less dispersion from each other as the elasticity of 
demand increases for any given level of price forecast errors.  Figure 6B and table 2, part 
2 show that at any given price forecast error level change (e.g. from 40% to 35%), 
benefits from access to better information show less variability due to changes in 
elasticities of demand.  This low sensitivity implies that investment in MIS should focus 
more in areas where quantity supplied adjusts significantly to information about future   44
prices (market information forecasts) more than focusing on crops where demand is 
price-elastic. 
 
3.8.3 Effect of Changes in Supply Elasticities  
From the model in equation 3.7, as the own-price elasticity of supply increases, 
the loss in social welfare increases.  This implies that lowering the supply elasticities has 
an effect of reducing the estimated social loss, thus favoring the objective of being 
conservative in estimating the benefits of access to improved information so as to obtain 
lower bound figures.  Thus, the sensitivity analysis done in this section is to reduce the 
elasticity of supply, holding elasticity of demand constant, such that benefits from 
improved price forecasts are not overestimated.  The elasticity of supply is reduced in the 
intervals of 25% up to 100%, reduction, i.e. up to where the elasticity of supply tends to 
zero. 
 
Figure 7:  Effect of a Decrease in Elasticity of Supply to Loss in Social 
Welfare and Marginal Returns from Access to Improved Price Forecasts for Maize, 
Millet, Paddy Rice and Sorghum in Mali, 2002 
Fig 7A. Effect of a decrease in elasticity of supply to 
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Fig 7B. Effect of decrease in elasticity of supply to 
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Figure 7A and table 3, part 1 show that for any given level of forecast error, as the 
elasticity of supply reduces, the loss of social welfare declines more rapidly than in the 
case of elasticity of supply in Figure 6A.  For example, in 2002, if a 40% forecast error is 
committed, at the base-case elasticities of demand shown in table 1, part 1; the loss to 
society is $5.4 million for the four cereal crops in 2002.  When the elasticities of supply 
are reduced by 50%, holding price forecast errors at 40%, the loss to society is $2.5 
million for the four cereal crops, representing only a 54% reduction in welfare loss.  
 
Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis of Effect of a Decrease in Elasticity of Supply to Loss in 
Social Welfare and Marginal Social Returns to Access to Improved Price Forecasts 
for Maize, Millet, Paddy Rice and Sorghum in Mali, 2002 
Part 1:  Senstivity of Loss in Social Welfare to Decrease in Elasticity of Supply
Price Forecast Error 0% Decrease 25% 50% 75% 100%
40% 5,363,046              3,852,791             2,455,531             1,171,268             -         
35% 4,106,082              2,949,793             1,880,016             896,752                -         
30% 3,016,713              2,167,195             1,381,236             658,838                -         
25% 2,094,940              1,504,996             959,192                457,526                -         
20% 1,340,761              963,198                613,883                292,817                -         
15% 754,178                 541,799                345,309                164,710                -         
10% 335,190                 240,799                153,471                73,204                  -         
5% 83,798                   60,200                  38,368                  18,301                  -         
0% -                         -                        -                        -                        -         
Part 2: Sensitivty of Marginal Social Returns to Decrease in Elasticity of Supply
Price Forecast Error fr0% Decrease 25% 50% 75% 100%
5% to 0% 83,798                   60,200                  38,368                  18,301                  -         
10% to 5% 251,393                 180,600                115,103                54,903                  -         
15% to 10% 418,988                 300,999                191,838                91,505                  -         
20% to 15% 586,583                 421,399                268,574                128,107                -         
25% to 20% 754,178                 541,799                345,309                164,710                -         
30% to 25% 921,774                 662,198                422,044                201,312                -         
35% to 30% 1,089,369              782,598                498,780                237,914                -         
40% to 35% 1,256,964              902,998                575,515                274,516                -         
Percentage Decrease in Elastisity of Supply
Percentage Decrease in Elastisity of Supply
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These results suggest that investment in MIS should focus more in areas where 
quantity supplied does adjust to price forecast errors more than on how quantity 
demanded adjusts. 
 
3.8.4 Effect of Joint Changes in Elasticities of Demand and Supply  
In this section, both elasticities are adjusted simultaneously.  The elasticity of 
demand is increased by 25% intervals up to 100% while the elasticity of supply is 
reduced in the intervals of 25% up to 100%.  A comparison of Figures 6, 7 and 8 shows 
that elasticity of demand does not cause a lot of variability in both social welfare loss and 
marginal benefits to access to improved forecast compared to changes in the elasticity of 
supply. 
Figure 8:  Joint Effect of an Increase in Elasticity of Demand and a Decrease 
in Elasticity of Supply to Loss in Social Welfare and Marginal Returns from Access 
to Improved Price Forecasts for Maize, Millet, Paddy Rice and Sorghum in Mali, 
2002 
Fig 8A. Effect of an increase in demand and a 
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Fig 8B. Effect of  an increase in demand and a 
decrease in elasticity of supply to marginal 
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Once again, this suggests that investments in access to improved information 
would give higher returns when there is a larger supply response than a demand response   47
to price forecast.  One of the implications of this is that there would be higher returns, 
ceteris paribus, to decentralized information provision, where targeting is based to crops 
with a higher elasticity of supply in any given agro-ecological zone or regional 
administrative area. 
Lastly, the value of farm production matters.  Intuitively, there would no need for 
an MIS if there was no production and marketing of produce.  It follows that MIS 
activities should be established in areas where substantial quantities of commodities are 
produced or have the capacity to be produced. 
 
Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis of Effect of Increase in Elasticity of Demand and 
Decrease in Elasticity of Supply to Loss in Social Welfare and Marginal Social 
Returns to Access to Improved Price Forecasts for Maize, Millet, Paddy Rice and 
Sorghum in Mali, 2002 
Part 1:  Senstivity of Loss in Social Welfare to Increase in Elasticity of Demand and Decrease in Elasticity of Supply.
Price Forecast Error 0% Increase/decrease 25% 50% 75% 100%
40% 5,363,046                      3,751,094             2,380,200             1,147,054            -                
35% 4,106,082                      2,871,931             1,822,341             878,213               -                
30% 3,016,713                      2,109,990             1,338,863             645,218               -                
25% 2,094,940                      1,465,271             929,766                448,068               -                
20% 1,340,761                      937,774                595,050                286,764               -                
15% 754,178                         527,498                334,716                161,304               -                
10% 335,190                         234,443                148,763                71,691                 -                
5% 83,798                           58,611                  37,191                  17,923                 -                
0% -                                 -                        -                        -                       -                
Part 2: Sensitivty of Marginal Social Returns to Increase in Elasticity of Demand and Decrease in Elasticity of Supply.
Price Forecast Error from 0% Increase/decrease 25% 50% 75% 100%
5% to 0% 83,798                           58,611                  37,191                  17,923                 -                
10% to 5% 251,393                         175,833                111,572                53,768                 -                
15% to 10% 418,988                         293,054                185,953                89,614                 -                
20% to 15% 586,583                         410,276                260,334                125,459               -                
25% to 20% 754,178                         527,498                334,716                161,304               -                
30% to 25% 921,774                         644,719                409,097                197,150               -                
35% to 30% 1,089,369                      761,941                483,478                232,995               -                
40% to 35% 1,256,964                      879,163                557,859                268,841               -                
Percentage Increase in Elasticity of Demand and Decrease in Elastisity of Supply
Percentage Increase in Elasticity of Demand and Decrease in Elastisity of Supply
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CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this paper, a partial equilibrium model is used to evaluate the impact of access 
to improved information to farmers and small-scale traders.  The value of information is 
estimated as the reduction in net social welfare loss when farmers, traders and consumers 
with rational expectations adjust their production and consumption behavior in response 
to improved information from the Market Information Systems.  The benefits from access 
to improved information can also be viewed as the reduction of the cost of being off the 
equilibrium price and quantity.  The results indicate that there would be more returns if 
improved market information is targeted to farmers and traders when: 
(1)  The level of uncertainty about future market price in the market is high.  
(2)  The own-price elasticity of demand for agricultural commodity is low. 
(3)  The own-price elasticity of supply for the agricultural commodity is high. 
(4)  The value of farm production of the crop is high. 
Since the elasticities of supply and demand; and the value of farm production are 
likely to be different for the four crops in different regions in Mali, the findings in this 
study suggest that decentralized, localized, crop-specific information services, targeted 
based on the above criterion, may have more returns than large centralized and uniformly 
distributed information services.  Here decentralization refers to collection, analysis and 
dissemination of market information on few crops in a given agro-ecological, market or 
administrative area or region.  Decentralization of MIS’s does not mean that each 
localized MIS is fully autonomous.  Other organizational structures such as 
administration and financing can remain centralized.  Uniformity refers to the tendency 
of national MIS to collect a wide range of information on all crops in a country.  The   49
criteria of identifying the crops would be based on the four parameters above (elasticities 
of supply and demand, level of future price uncertainty and value of crop production). 
Though the analysis in this study was not done on a regional basis, the results 
suggest that provision of information services be targeted such that crop-specific 
information is collected, analyzed and disseminated to areas where the value of 
agricultural production of the selected crops is high.  For instance, if the value of 
agricultural production is high for rice, and not millet and sorghum, then it is better that 
the MIS provides price forecasts and other market information on rice.  This would be 
cost saving in terms of time and money, and increases the accuracy and timeliness which 
results into higher benefits to society.    50
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